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This dissertation consists of three independent essays. The
first essay analyses the relationship between Schumpeterian
growth and subjective well-being. The second essay investigates whether more generous unemployment insurance
(UI) leads job seekers to be more selective in the job they
are looking for. In particular, it estimates the elasticity of the
reservation wage and of other dimensions of job selectivity
with respect to the potential duration of benefits. The third
essay studies whether there remains a causal nonpecuniary
effect of job loss on health when the income shock is well insured by UI. It looks at whether exogenous job losses driven
by establishment closures in Denmark in the 2000s had any
effect on prescription drug purchases, doctors’ visits, hospital
diagnoses, and mortality.

Chapter 1
Creative Destruction and Subjective Well-Being
(coauthored with Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, and Angus
Deaton)
This chapter analyses the relationship between turnoverdriven growth and subjective well-being (SWB). The existing empirical literature on happiness and income looks at
how various measures of SWB relate to individual income,
GDP per capita, or GDP growth, but without looking in
further detail at what drives the growth process and at how
the determinants of growth affect well-being. This paper
provides a first attempt at filling this gap. More specifically,
we look at how an important engine of growth—namely,
Schumpeterian creative destruction with its resulting flow of
entry and exit of firms and jobs—affects SWB differently for
different types of individuals and in different types of labor
markets.
In the first part of the paper we develop a simple Schumpeterian model of growth and unemployment to organize our
thoughts and generate predictions on the potential effects of
turnover on life satisfaction. In this model, growth results
from quality-improving innovations. Each time a new
innovator enters a sector, the worker currently employed in
that sector loses her job and the firm posts a new vacancy.
Production in the sector resumes with the new technology
only when the firm has found a new suitable worker. Life
satisfaction is captured by the expected discounted valuation
of an individual’s future earnings. In the model, a higher
rate of turnover has both direct and indirect effects on life
satisfaction. The direct effects are that, everything else equal,
more turnover translates into both a higher probability of
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becoming unemployed for the employed, which reduces life
satisfaction, and a higher probability for the unemployed to
find a new job, which increases life satisfaction. The indirect effect is that a higher rate of turnover implies a higher
growth externality and therefore a higher net present value
of future earnings: this enhances life satisfaction. Overall,
a first prediction of the model is that a higher turnover rate
increases well-being more when controlling for aggregate
unemployment than when not. A second prediction is that job
creation increases and job destruction decreases well-being.
A third prediction is that job destruction has a less negative effect on well-being when the unemployment benefits
are more generous. A fourth prediction is that job creation
increases future well-being more for more forward-looking
individuals.
In the second part of the paper we test the predictions of
the model using cross-sectional metropolitan statistical area
(MSA)-level U.S. data. To measure creative destruction we
follow Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and use their
measure of job turnover, defined as the job creation rate plus
the job destruction rate. The data come from the Census
Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics and are at the MSA
level. In addition, we also use from the Census Bureau the
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data,
which provide information on hires, separations, employment, and thus turnover, also at the MSA level. To measure
SWB, we use the Cantril ladder of life from the Gallup
Healthways Well-Being Index (Gallup), which asks individuals about both current and future well-being. The Cantril
ladder is based on the following questions: “Imagine a ladder
with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top;
the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you
and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible
life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you
personally feel you stand at this time? And which level of
the ladder do you anticipate to achieve in five years?” For robustness purposes, we also use the life satisfaction question
from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.
We investigate whether Schumpeterian creative destruction affects these measures of well-being positively
or negatively by regressing our measures of SWB on our
creative destruction variables. The empirical analysis using
cross-sectional MSA-level data on SWB and job turnover
vindicates the theoretical predictions. Namely, we find that
the effect of creative destruction on well-being is positive
when we control for MSA-level unemployment and less so if
we do not; the effects of job creation and job destruction on
well-being are positive and negative, respectively; and job
destruction has less negative effect when unemployment benefits are higher. Moreover, we find some evidence that job
creation has a more positive impact on future well-being for
more forward-looking individuals when we use income, age,
and education to proxy for patience. These results are not
only consistent with the theory, but they are also remarkably
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robust. They hold whether looking at well-being at the MSA
level or the individual level, or whether using the Business
Dynamic Statistics or the LEHD data to construct our proxy
for creative destruction.
The paper relates to two main strands of literature; first,
to the literature on innovation-led growth, job turnover,
and unemployment. Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998) and
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) point to two opposite effects of growth on unemployment. One is a “capitalization”
effect whereby more growth reduces the rate at which firms
discount the future returns from creating a new vacancy: this
effect pushes toward creating more vacancies and thus toward reducing the equilibrium unemployment. The counteracting effect is a “creative destruction” effect whereby more
growth implies a higher rate of job destruction, which in turn
tends to increase the equilibrium level of unemployment. We
contribute to this literature by looking at the counteracting
effects of innovation-led growth on SWB.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on SWB.
Despite a now large literature on self-reported well-being,
there is no general consensus on how seriously these SWB
measures should be taken, or on exactly what they mean.
Indeed, some of the most exciting recent work (e.g., see
Benjamin et al. [2012, 2014]) is investigating these fundamental questions. In this paper, we find that life satisfaction
responds to the future growth prospects that are inherent
in creative destruction, even despite the related short-run
unemployment effects, and at the same time we provide
some evidence of the validity and usefulness of self-reported
well-being as a measure of expected future material wellbeing. Such findings have not been documented in the relevant literature so far, and they provide further evidence of the
usefulness of these well-being measures.

Chapter 2
Unemployment Insurance and Reservation
Wages: Evidence from Administrative Data
(coauthored with Thomas Le Barbanchon and Roland
Rathelot)
This chapter investigates whether more generous UI
leads job seekers to be more selective in their job search. In
standard job search models, unemployed workers receive
job offers that they accept if the value of the offered job is
higher than the value of unemployment (McCall 1970). Their
search strategy can be summarized by one key concept, the
reservation wage, which is the lowest wage of an acceptable
job offer. Although the reservation wage plays a central role
in job search models, it is rarely observed. Thus, empirical
evidence on the determinants of reservation wages, including
key policy variables such as UI, is scarce.
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In theory, more generous UI increases the value of unemployment, and thus also increases reservation wages. A
recent strand of the empirical literature documents modest—
either positive or negative—UI effects on accepted wages
(Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007; Le Barbanchon 2016; Nekoei and Weber 2017; Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender
2012, 2016). However, reemployment wages are the equilibrium outcome of both the job seekers’ preferences and wages
offered by employers. A vast empirical literature has documented that a more generous UI system increases the time
that job seekers spend in nonemployment (see the review by
Schmieder and von Wachter [2016]), which in turn tends to
decrease their job prospects and the wages they are offered.
This negative duration-dependence channel can come from
skill depreciation, firms’ discrimination against long-term
unemployed or heterogeneity. At the same time, job seekers’
preferences should push in the other direction. Indeed, as we
explained, job seekers should become more selective in the
wages they are willing to accept because staying unemployed
is less costly when the system is more generous. These two
offsetting effects would be consistent with modest effects
on reemployment wages despite a strong effect of UI on job
seekers’ preferences. To make progress on this question, we
need both direct data on reservation wages and an exogenous
source of variation in the generosity of UI.
This paper takes advantage of unique administrative data
on reservation wages and of a quasi-experimental research
design. In France, when newly unemployed job seekers
register at the public employment service to claim UI benefits, they have to declare their reservation wage and other
information on the job they are looking for, such as commuting time/distance, desired number of hours and type of labor
contract (temporary vs. long-term). Our main identification
strategy relies on a reform that altered the potential benefit
duration (PBD)—the maximum number of days of benefits—
for some claimants while leaving it unchanged for others,
depending on their previous work tenure. Using this natural
experiment, we compute difference-in-differences estimates
of the elasticity of reservation wages with respect to PBD.
Our results point to the lack of responsiveness of reservation
wages and other dimensions of job selectivity to the potential
duration of benefits. We obtain very similar results using an
alternative identification strategy, based on the discontinuity
of the PBD schedule at age 50.
While the previous literature on reservation wages is
based on survey data (Feldstein and Poterba 1984; Koenig,
Manning, and Petrongolo 2014; Krueger and Mueller 2016),
we use administrative data on reservation wages. Our data
thus have several strengths: large sample size, no missing
values due to nonresponse, and precise measures of UIrelated policy variables and past labor outcomes, such as past
tenure or past wages. The question is stated in these terms:
“What minimum gross wage do you ask for?” We check that
the distribution of this self-reported measure of reservation
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wage makes sense and is correlated with sociodemographic
characteristics in a meaningful manner, for a given preunemployment wage. Moreover, the data also enable us
to follow workers over multiple claims so that we observe
repeated measures of reservation wages for a given worker.
We verify that, consistent with the theoretical definition of
the reservation wage, claimants stating higher reservation
wages remain unemployed for a longer time period, holding
constant the claimants’ and the claims’ characteristics, and
controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity of
claimants (fixed effects models). This first result confirms
that the reservation wage stated by claimants to the UI
agency is meaningful.
Our main identification strategy relies on a UI reform,
which occurred in 2009. The reform was not triggered by
the Great Recession. Its main objective was to simplify the
rules according to which the potential duration of benefits
is computed. In France, PBD is mainly determined by the
claimant’s previous work duration. Before the 2009 reform,
PBD was a step function of past tenure. The 2009 reform
simplified the rule and made it linear, entitling claimants to
as many days of benefits as days of work in the previous two
years. The overall generosity of the system was not affected,
but some tenure groups benefited from the reform while others lost. Some tenure groups were unaffected and can be used
as control groups in a difference-in-differences setting.
Whatever the statistical specification we use, we cannot
reject that the elasticity of reservation wages with respect
to PBD is zero at the 5 percent level. Our results are very
precise and, in our favorite specification, rule out elasticities
greater than 0.006: a 10 percent increase in potential benefit
duration cannot trigger an increase of the reservation wage of
more than 0.06 percent. The elasticity of the actual duration
of benefits with respect to PBD, estimated at 0.3, is in line
with most results of the literature. Importantly, we also find
that more generous benefits slow down job finding, even
at the beginning of the spell when claimants declare their
reservation wages.
Looking at other dimensions of job selectivity, we do not
find any significant effect of PBD on the maximum commuting time/distance that job seekers are willing to accept. Nor
do we find any effect of PBD on the number of hours or on
the type of contract job seekers are looking for. The absence
of responsiveness in all dimensions of job selectivity is a
strong result. While the nonresponsiveness of reservation
wages could have been explained by strong wage rigidity
and low mobility across jobs, the fact that the willingness
to find open-ended contracts and to ensure that job security
does not change with PBD suggests that rigid labor markets
are unlikely to be the only explanation to our results.
While the elasticity of reservation wages is zero on
average, we find that it amounts to a significant 0.01 for job
seekers with the lowest past tenure. These job seekers are
entitled to short PBD, and the date when their benefits could
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elapse is close to their registration date, when they declare
their reservation wages. Consistently, we also find that the
elasticity of actual benefit duration is higher for these short
tenure claimants. We do not find any significant heterogeneity of the PBD elasticity of reservation wages across gender
or past wage groups.
We can check the robustness of our main results using
another identification strategy, a Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD). When an unemployed worker is over 50
years old at the separation date from his previous employer,
he benefits from more generous PBDs, which are on average
30 percent longer. We find some manipulation of the separation date around the 50-year-old cutoff. Consequently, we
adopt a “donut” RDD strategy, which excludes observations
in a window around the cutoff of the running variable. As
with our main difference-in-differences strategy, we cannot
reject that the PBD elasticity of reservation wages is equal to
zero, while the elasticity of actual benefit duration is around
0.2. Claimants in the RDD strategy are different from those
of the difference-in-differences; in particular, they are more
attached to the labor force and older, yet results are very
similar.
Lastly, we discuss the theoretical relation between the
elasticities of unemployment duration and the reservation
wage with respect to PBD. In partial equilibrium, we can
decompose the elasticity of unemployment duration into two
components: one due to the elasticity of the reservation wage
(scaled by the slope of the wage offer distribution taken at
the level of the reservation wage) and the other one due to
the elasticity of the job offer arrival rate (or search effort).
Taking the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval
of the estimate of the reservation wage elasticity, we find that
the reservation wage margin accounts, at most, for 6 percent
of the elasticity of unemployment duration, the rest being
attributed to the elasticity of search effort.
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one
to obtain precise quasi-experimental estimates of the effect
of more generous UI on self-reported reservation wages and
other dimensions of job selectivity. Most previous contributions could not rely on credible exogenous variations in
UI generosity and find mixed results. Feldstein and Poterba
(1984) find a large elasticity of reservation wages to benefit
levels, while Krueger and Mueller (2016) cannot reject that
this elasticity is equal to zero.
As I mentioned, our findings on reservation wage responsiveness shed light on the current debate on the effect of UI
on accepted wages. Our results show that changes in PBD
have no significant effect on job selectivity at the beginning of the job-search spell for the average job seeker. The
absence of selectivity effect is in line with the conclusion of
Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2016) that reservation
wages are not binding in Germany. When we focus on job
seekers with short potential benefit duration, who are more
comparable to claimants in the Austrian sample of Nekoei
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and Weber (2017), we find an estimate of the elasticity of
reservation wages around 0.01, which has a magnitude
similar to the estimate Nekoei and Weber (2017) find on the
elasticity of accepted wages with respect to PBD (0.016).
Our results have some policy implications. The Great
Recession has revived a debate about how UI should react to
an increase in the unemployment rate. Increasing potential
benefit duration improves the insurance provided to workers
facing more instability but bears the cost of lengthening nonemployment duration. These benefits and costs may weigh
differently in good and bad times. Part of the literature argues
that UI should be countercyclical, which is more generous in
crisis times (Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2016; Marinescu
2017). Others suggest that increasing the generosity during
bad times amplifies the crisis by pushing job seekers to be
more selective: the cost of labor increases and the number
of jobs further shrinks (Hagedorn et al. 2013). The evidence
we bring does not support this last argument. If job seekers
are not pickier when they are more protected, increasing the
generosity of UI during crises should not lead to any substantial loss of jobs.

Chapter 3
The Causal Effect of Job Loss on Health: The
Danish Miracle?
The third and last chapters study the causal effect of job
loss on health. Job loss can affect health both through the income shock and through nonpecuniary channels like the loss
of self-esteem or the loss of a structured schedule. I investigate whether there is still a causal effect of job loss on health
in a setting where the unemployment risk is well-insured by
policy through generous UI, active labor market policies,
and public health insurance with universal coverage. Using
Danish administrative data and a difference-in-differences
design, I compare the health of roughly 25,000 high-tenure
workers who are at an establishment that closes between
2001 and 2006 to that of a control group of workers matched
on observables who do not experience a closure. I find that in
such a setting job losses do not cause large significant effects
on health, whether looking at mental health proxies such as
antidepressant purchases, severe physical health outcomes
that require inpatient care, or mortality. I can rule out effect
on most health outcomes of the order of 1 or 2 percent. For
mortality I can rule out effects of 15 percent. My results
taken together with prior literature suggest that it is possible,
presumably through an adequate set of policies, to make the
causal effect of job loss on health negligible.
The seminal work in sociology on the unemployed
community of Marienthal, a small town in Austria where the
main factory closed in 1930 and left many people unemployed for a long time, shows how desperate the unemployed
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and their families can become and the many dimensions in
life that can be affected, from standards of living to the loss
of a sense of purpose or of a social identity (Lazarsfeld, Jahoda, and Zeisel 1933). Fortunately, since the Great Depression, developed countries have implemented some policies to
alleviate the burden of unemployment, particularly UI. But
job loss might also entail some nonpecuniary aspects against
which policy cannot provide insurance.
This paper investigates whether there remains a causal
effect of job loss on health, particularly mental health and
substance abuse, in a setting where UI is generous, active
labor market policies are available, and health insurance is
universal. The identification strategy relies on establishment
closures, which lead to job losses that are arguably exogenous to employees’ health. The context is that of Denmark
after the implementation of flexicurity policies. The replacement rate of UI is 90 percent (with a cap, which in 2015 was
roughly equivalent to US$628 per week), and the maximum
potential duration of unemployment benefits, though it has
been gradually reduced, remains long: four years during
2001–2010, the relevant period for this study. Active labor
market policies are in place since 1994. Moreover, health
insurance is publicly provided with universal coverage.
Using a difference-in-differences design and Danish
administrative data, I compare the health of roughly 25,000
workers who experience an establishment closure to that of a
control group matched on observables. I find that on average
in Denmark, job losses due to establishment closures that occurred between 2001 and 2006 did not cause large significant
health problems.
I focus on people strongly attached to their jobs: my
sample consists of men and women aged 25–60 who have at
least five years of tenure at their establishment; 25 percent
of my treatment group goes through a period of unemployment in the year of the closure, as opposed to 4 percent in the
control group. They are also more likely to leave the labor
force. However, despite a long-lasting effect on their wage
earnings, they experience only a 6 percent drop in posttax, posttransfer household income. In terms of health, the
treatment group is not significantly more likely to purchase
antidepressants or other antianxiety drugs, which I use as a
proxy for mental health. I can rule out effects on the order of
2 percent. I do not observe any change in their regular health
care consumption, such as the number of visits to the General
Practitioner, or any effect on severe physical health outcomes
that requires inpatient care at the hospital, for which I can
rule out, respectively, effects of the order of 1 and 4 percent.
Mortality is also not significantly affected. The two exceptions for which I find a marginally significant effect are visits
to the hospital for alcohol issues, but results are not very
precisely estimated, as well as purchases of diabetes-related
drugs, which may well be a false positive.
This paper is related to several lines of research. The most
closely related papers, which I discuss in further detail in
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the paper, are those looking at the effect of mass layoffs or
plant closures on some health outcomes. Results from this
literature are mixed: while some papers find strong effects,
especially on mortality for males (Browning and Heinesen
2012; Eliason and Storrie 2009a; Rege, Telle, and Votruba
2009; Sullivan and Von Wachter 2009), others find a relatively precise zero (Browning, Dano, and Heinesen 2006;
Kuhn, Lalive, and Zweimuller 2009). Part of the variety of
the results comes from differences in the precise definition
of the treatment and of the control groups as well as sample
restrictions and outcomes of interest (for instance, many
papers focus on mortality for males, and although I do find
positive point estimates for mortality for males, they are not
significant or large) or on some methodological differences
(whether one includes the deaths that occur in the year of
displacement can make a difference).1 But another part presumably has to do with the fact that the effect of job loss on
health depends on the institutional context, and it is hard to
compare results across countries.
I contribute to the literature by looking at a wide set of
health outcomes with a long period of observation, which
allows me to give a comprehensive picture. Moreover, I am
able to provide direct visual evidence that the treatment and
control groups were on parallel trends in terms of health in
the five years before the job loss shock. I interpret my results
as showing that it is possible, presumably through an adequate set of policies, to make the causal effect of job loss on
health very small, if not negligible.
The paper also relates to work on unemployment and
subjective well-being (Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998).
This literature has shown that unemployment is associated
with lower subjective well-being. My paper adds to this
literature by focusing on job losses that are arguably exogenous and by aiming at capturing more objective but also
more severe health conditions. Unemployment may well lead
to lower satisfaction in Denmark as well, but if it is not to the
point that people start taking antidepressants or find themselves to be in worse health, it may not require any further
involvement from policy.
This paper also relates to work on income-health gradients, particularly recent work by Cesarini et al. (2016) on
the causal effect of wealth on health and child development
in Sweden. They find that an exogenous increase in wealth
(from winning a lottery) has no overall effect on health, neither on mortality nor on health care utilization. This evidence
is totally in line with what I find: nowadays in Scandinavian
countries, the cross-sectional association between health and
economic variables seems mostly driven by selection.
Finally, the paper can relate to rising concerns in the United States about addiction to painkillers and the increase in
mortality from poisoning, suicide, and alcohol-related deaths
highlighted by Case and Deaton (2015). Data from the International Narcotics Control Board show that Denmark also
experienced rising trends in painkillers consumption. My
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data allow me to test whether job loss makes people more
likely to develop addiction to such substances, to engage in
excessive alcohol drinking, or to commit suicide. Despite a
strong association in the cross-section between unemployment and purchases of opioid painkillers, I do not find any
effect on such purchases following an exogenous layoff.
Note
1. As I show in the paper, there is a strong significant difference
in death hazard of treatment vs. control group in the year of
displacement, but some of these deaths could be the cause of
the establishment closure rather than caused by the closure. This
reverse causality concern seems more relevant because the difference is entirely driven by the smallest establishments. Thus,
though I show results both with and without the deaths of year
0, my preferred estimates are, as in Sullivan and von Wachter
(2009), the ones that focus on deaths that occurred from year
one onward.
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